The ongoing conflict in Ukraine is causing rapid technological advancements in the field of military technology. One of the prominent changes in this regard includes the sudden development of fibre-optic first-person view drones that completely bypass all electronic warfare and leave many C-UAS options ineffective. It has become an urgent and complicated problem for Europeans.
This is an ongoing process at UAV Defence where we are constantly monitoring such new strategies to ensure that our detection and countermeasures remain relevant. The following article discusses the working of fibre-optic drones, their resistance to conventional jamming measures, and how they need to be countered.
What You Need to Know
The fibre optic FPV drones deploy a physical, hair-like cable as they travel through the air, ensuring they maintain a connection with the operator. Because they do not use any radio frequency transmission, they cannot be jammed using RF jammers and also cannot be detected by any RF detectors or GNSS spoofers. In order to defeat these drones, security organisations need to change their approach to EW to multi-sensor integration.
Executive Summary
Fibre-optic drones have moved on from mere experimentation to operational weapons after their adoption during the Kursk operation, which started in August 2024. Currently, both Ukraine and Russia manufacture systems that can reach up to 50 kilometres. The danger that Europe faces from fibre-optic FPV drones originates from the fact that such drones are immune to RF interference.
The consequences for critical infrastructure, airport security, and border protection are serious indeed. All those systems that depend extensively on radio frequency sniffers and counter-drone jammers become helpless because such drones do not emit any signals and cannot be jammed. The security of European skies now requires an integration of active and passive detection systems with physical protection.
What Are Fibre-Optic FPV Drones?
While a fibre optic FPV drone bears a close resemblance to an ordinary tactical UAV, there is one difference that makes it unique: the C2 connection system. While in a normal UAV, the video is transmitted and flight commands are received via radio frequency signals, in a fibre-optic FPV drone, the UAV gradually releases optical fibre during flight.
The Shift from Radio Frequency to Physical Tether
The communication channel of traditional FPV drones is established through the high-frequency bands of the radio spectrum, such as 900 MHz, 2.4 GHz, or 5.8 GHz. These drones are at risk because electronic warfare can disrupt this frequency band through interference.
These drones use fibre optics to eliminate such weaknesses. These drones contain an optical cable in a customised spool inside the aircraft, which unravels at the back of the drone as it travels forward, laying along the ground surface. This is because data is transmitted through pulses of light through the physical cable, and thus there is no emission of any electromagnetic waves to be picked by the adversary.
Technical Capabilities and Mechanics
Our survey of battlefield data from Ukraine indicates that our early predictions regarding the constraints associated with physical tether technology were incorrect.
Firstly, most of us thought that the thin wire would get entangled in the trees or any other physical obstructions and would also be slowed down by the weight of the reel, making the range of action very short. However, it has been seen that the thin wire runs perfectly smooth due to the forward momentum of the drone and is just lying on top of the forest/trees/buildings.
In addition to this, the physical connection provides massive bandwidth capabilities. This makes it possible for pilots to have access to high-definition videos without any delay at all, and this helps them to perform terminal guidance with extreme accuracy.
The Tactical Shift in Ukraine’s Drone Warfare
The true driving force for this innovation was the harsh electronic warfare seen early on the Eastern Front. Already by early 2024, the skies of Ukraine were so full of jamming devices that RF control drones failed in some areas at more than 70 per cent rates.
The Kursk Proving Ground
The turning point arrived in August 2024, as part of Ukraine’s incursion into the Kursk Oblast, when Russian forces started utilising FPV drones connected via a wire to attack Ukrainian supply lines. Failing to detect any radio connection that could be utilised, the Ukrainian electronic warfare units found themselves powerless to stop the advancing strikes.
In the beginning of 2025, Ukraine’s dynamic technology sector managed to replicate the design and progress with it further. Currently, thousands of these devices are being employed monthly by both parties. They are employed for attacks on supply depots, destruction of defended positions, and destruction of critical equipment such as radars and artillery systems.
Implications for NATO and Allied Forces
The lesson from the frontline is clear: reliance upon the electromagnetic spectrum is an obvious weakness. As the 2025 NATO Innovation Challenge makes clear, where the competition centred almost exclusively on this problem, the procurement teams have to look ahead to wars in the future where there will be no GPS signal and RF jamming. The tethered drone is no longer a one-off solution on the modern battlefield but an integral part of it.
Why Traditional Counter-UAS Strategies Fail
Over the past decade, C-UAS technology has mainly revolved around electronic countermeasures. This technique has proved to be very effective for COTS drones like DJI since they rely heavily on RF and GNSS signals. However, the physics behind fibre-optic communication negates this approach.
The Collapse of Electronic Warfare Mitigation
It is based on the idea of overpowering the receiver with a more potent and concentrated signal. It will not be able to interfere with a drone which does not have an RF receiver. There is nothing that can stop a fibre-optic drone from flying through the highly focused signal of the jamming device without experiencing any fluctuations in its video feed.
GNSS spoofing, which misleads the drone about its location or forces it to land, cannot be used against an FPV drone either.
The Blind Spot in Passive RF Detection
A possibly even more dangerous problem could be detection. Most important infrastructures rely on passive detection systems, namely RF sniffers, to detect any threats approaching them. Such devices scan the airspace around them and locate the specific radio frequencies that drones use for control. Yet tethered drones become undetectable by RF sensors due to the fact that they emit no RF energy.
Thus, a person might deploy a drone beyond the perimeter of the facility, bring it inside, and the RF scanner will not alert anyone. Too many times, facility owners assume that their airspace is secure when there are no RF signals detected.
Threat Matrix: RF Drones vs Fibre-Optic Drones
| Feature | Standard RF Drone | Fibre-Optic FPV Drone |
| Command Link | Radio Frequency | Physical Optical Cable |
| RF Signature | High (Continuous emission) | None |
| Video Latency | Variable (Prone to interference) | Zero (Uncompressed HD) |
| Susceptible to Jamming | Yes | No |
| Susceptible to Spoofing | Yes | No |
| Primary Detection Method | RF Scanners | Radar, EO/IR, Acoustic |
Assessing the Fibre Optic FPV Drone Threat Europe Faces
With this technology transitioning from military use to a broader application in security, its implications for European defence and security issues are significant. The parts required to build a wire-guided drone are readily available and inexpensive, thus making them quite popular among non-state entities, terrorist groups, and foreign intelligence agencies.
We evaluate the threat posed by the fibre-optic FPV drone in Europe across three distinct operational scenarios.
Risks to Critical Infrastructure
The power grid, civilian nuclear plant, and fuel station represent stationary and valuable targets. A malevolent entity with a tethered UAV could breach an electronic fence and deliver a tiny explosive package to a vulnerable coolant unit or a transformer. With clear visual imagery feeding the controller until the moment of explosion, accuracy is almost assured. The UK MoD and the European Commission have emphasised that it is imperative to protect the critical infrastructure of nations from stealthy aerial attack.
Airport Security Vulnerabilities
Airports are one of the most difficult environments in which to conduct counterdrone operations due to the vast volume of legal radio communications and the criticality of not interfering with civilian air traffic. While regular drones can be jammed or made to come back home, a drone that is tethered to the ground and flown near an airport in Frankfurt or Heathrow will not be stopped from doing so by electronic means. The security forces will have just seconds to find and neutralise the threat.
Border Surveillance Challenges
For Eastern European states like those situated around Russia and Belarus, there are many problems facing them. These include areas around Estonia’s capital of Tallinn, Latvia’s capital of Riga, Lithuania’s capital of Vilnius, and Poland’s capital of Warsaw, which are very wooded and sensitive areas. Smugglers and adversarial states can use tethered drones for conducting extensive surveillance missions or transporting tiny loads across borders while remaining almost undetected using the wide range of RF detection systems employed by border control agencies.
How to Detect Non-Emitting Drones: What Still Works?
The European solution to the problem of fibre-optic FPV drones requires a complete redesign of its detection strategy. Since the drone radio traffic cannot be intercepted, it is necessary to find a way to detect the actual existence of the drone in the environment.
From our experience, there is no other way but to employ the multi-layered approach to sensing.
Drone Detection Radar
Radar, an active technology, is still considered the best way to detect an object at a distance. Unlike RF scanners that merely scan the environment, radar transmits radio waves and analyses their reflections from actual objects.
Detecting an FPV drone flying near the ground presents technical challenges. The RCS of such a drone is very small and includes mainly its engines, batteries, and some carbon fibre parts. Flying at ground level increases radar clutter by adding reflections from trees, houses, cars, etc.
In order to overcome such problems, UAV protection radars are designed to work in high-frequency ranges, like Ku-band and X-band, along with advanced Doppler signal processing techniques. The Doppler signal processing methods help distinguish between moving targets and nonmoving targets and focus on detecting the micro-Doppler signals generated by rapid rotations of drones’ propellers. Therefore, we propose using three-dimensional AESA radars for tracking highly agile and fast-moving targets.
EO/IR Sensors and Optical Tracking
The process begins when an active radar detects a possible target, after which the EO/IR cameras quickly align on the location in order to verify that the target indeed poses a threat.
Optical detection is critical in the case of tethered UAVs Highly accurate optical cameras combined with sophisticated thermal imaging systems detect the heat produced by the engines and the batteries. Under some circumstances, the best optical cameras will even be able to pick up the reflection of the optical tether. Nowadays, artificial intelligence is critical as modern computer vision algorithms are able to recognise a drone instantly.
Acoustic Sensors
Even though the range is small, acoustic sensors are an important secondary detection system. The high-speed motors on FPV drones make them have a very unique and high-frequency sound that can be detected by these sensors. Acoustic sensors have an advantage since, unlike other forms of detection methods, they work in urban and forested areas.
Kinetic Interception: Mitigating the Unjammable
Identifying a drone tethered to a control centre is simply the first step; as these drones cannot be jammed, they need to be destroyed or disintegrated before reaching their destination. This involves a process known as kinetic mitigation, which comes with several legal and safety concerns apart from war zones.
AI Turrets and Automated Effectors
The Ukrainian counter to the threat of wire-guided drones has involved the rapid mobilisation of automated and semi-automated kinetic weapons. At the front lines, there are artificial intelligence turrets which can calculate the intercept trajectory and launch attacks against incoming drones using small-arms fire or air-burst rounds. All that is left for human operators to do is press a confirmation button.
European procurement programs for defence equipment now require systems which can fire proximity-fused ammunition, which releases a rain of shrapnel in the path of the drone.
Interceptor Drones
In cases of domestic security, in which it is not advisable to shoot with conventional weaponry, intercepting drones would be the best way forward. This is because the drone will either fly into the drone or use a net to disable its propellers.
Once the facility’s radar discovers that there is an approaching tethered drone, an intercepting drone is automatically deployed to deal with the menace. It uses its artificial intelligence technology together with the radar data to destroy the menace.
Decision Matrix: Mitigation Options
| Mitigation Type | Effectiveness against Fibre-Optic | Collateral Damage Risk | Best Use Case |
| RF Jamming | Zero | Low | N/A |
| Directed Energy (Laser) | High | Medium | Military Bases, Borders |
| Airburst Munitions | High | High | Active Combat Zones |
| Interceptor Drones (Nets/Impact) | Medium | Low | Airports, Urban Infrastructure |
Preparing European Defence and Security for the Next Generation of Threats
Time is running out for the chance to get used to the technology. Fibre-optic FPVs have moved from the realm of theory to being a tested, factory-made solution. We at UAV Defence recommend that our customers reassess all their risks.
Procurement Considerations for Government Agencies
Budget allocations for stand-alone EW solutions should be shifted to investments in command-and-control solutions that are fully integrated.
- Mandate Multi-Sensor Integration: One sensor cannot provide total awareness of airspace. There has to be strict integration of active radar, EO/IR cameras, and kinetic effectors.
- Prioritise Active Detection: Passive radio frequency detection must remain secondary to active detection. Research should be aimed at developing a high-resolution Doppler radar that is able to filter ground clutter.
- Invest in Hard Kill Solutions: European military forces need to urgently purchase interception drones, energy-based systems, and automated turrets to take out threats that don’t emit any signals.
Steps for Facility Managers
If you’re in charge of critical infrastructure or a highly secured location, then you cannot rely on legacy drone defence systems.
- Audit Existing Systems: The first step is to do an audit of your current system. What exactly is getting detected in your current C-UAS deployment? If it is based purely on RF detection systems, then you’re vulnerable to wire-guided systems.
- Implement Radar Coverage: Strengthen the protection of your perimeter with micro-Doppler radar, which is specially designed for small unmanned aerial vehicles (sUAS).
- Update Protocols: Change your standard operating procedures in order to instruct your staff on how to react in case of a drone attack if jamming fails.
- Read our detailed breakdown: For a deeper technical dive into how optical tethers work, read our comprehensive guide: Fiber-Optic FPV Drones Explained: Why They Defeat RF Jamming and How to Counter Them.
Ending Remarks
The advancements made by the drones in Ukraine are permanent changes to the security environment. The fibre optic FPV drones demonstrate a critical flaw in the world’s anti-UAS systems: their heavy dependence on the electromagnetic spectrum. Since these drones employ a physical tether for manoeuvring, they cannot be detected through electronic means and launch attacks seamlessly.
However, the fibre-optic FPV drone problem posed by Europe poses no insignificant challenge, although it is not insurmountable. Through an active approach based on advanced drone-detecting radars and artificial intelligence-supported optical tracking, alongside kinetic interceptions, we can shield our key military and infrastructure installations from this novel class of threat.
The era when you relied solely on a jammer for protection from drone attacks is gone. Detection needs to be real, and mitigation needs to be physical.
Are you trying to determine how vulnerable your site is to drones that don’t emit? Our engineers can assist you with that. Call us now to discover how we can incorporate UAV Defence Radars, Integrated Detection & Jamming, and Drone Detection Systems at your location.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is a fibre-optic FPV drone?
An aircraft that is uncrewed and is fitted with an optical fibre that trails behind the plane while it flies. This plane does not use radio signals but uses an optical fibre cable to communicate with the controller.
Why are fibre-optic drones immune to jamming?
Jamming works through the process of interfering with the radio frequency communication between the drone and its operator. Fibre-optic drones don’t make use of radio frequencies, and thus there is no communication to jam. This makes electronic warfare useless in this case.
Can passive RF sensors detect wire-guided drones?
RF sniffers, which are known as passive RF sensors, detect drones on account of certain specific frequencies being emitted. However, since there is no transmission of any radio frequency from tethered drones, they become totally invisible to such sensors.
How far can a fibre-optic drone fly?
At the beginning, the distance was limited by the weight of the cable reel, but thanks to technological development, this limit was soon surpassed. At present, the devices operating in Ukraine hit the targets at a distance of 30 to 50 kilometres, without breaking or tangling the cable.
What is the best way to detect non-emitting drones?
However, a combination of several sensors using the most active 3D micro-Doppler radar would work better to identify drones since it is capable of monitoring both the physical movement of the drone and its spinning rotors with the help of the EO/IR cameras.
How can security teams mitigate unjammable drones?
Since electronic countermeasures might prove ineffective, it is necessary to implement a kinetic solution to this issue. Some of these measures could involve launching interceptors, which physically ram or capture the target, employing directed energy weapons such as lasers, and using AI-operated turrets, which launch airburst ammunition.